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Learning in Bayesian Regulation
Semih Koray and Ismail Saglam
We examine the issue of learning in a generalized principal-agent
model with incomplete information. We show that there are sit-
uations in which the agent prefers a Bayesian regulator to have
more information about his private type. Moreover, the out-
come of the Bayesian mechanism regulating the agent is path-
dependent; i.e. the convergence of the regulator’s belief to the
truth does not always yield the complete information outcome.
Keywords: Learning, Principle-Agent Model, Bayesian Regula-
tion, Incomplete Information Learning.
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1 Introduction
The issue of learning has occupied an important place in the recent literature
of game theory while most of the pioneering studies have focused on learning
in repeated games with incomplete information. For example, Jordan (1991)
considers a noncooperative normal form game where each player is endowed
with full Bayesian rationality and has prior beliefs about his opponents’ pri-
vately known payoﬀs. The Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game needs not
coincide with the Nash equilibrium of the complete information (true) game.
However, Jordan shows that under certain restrictions on beliefs the players
in a repeated play of the described normal form game can learn to play the
Nash equilibrium of the complete information game even though they will
not necessarily attain complete information. Kalai and Lehrer (1993) and
Blume and Easley (1995) obtain a similar convergence result for inﬁnitely re-
peated games that involve non-myopic players. The empirical evaluations of
the Jordan’s Bayesian learning model was recently evaluated in Cox, Shachat
and Walker (2001), which shows that when the true game had a unique pure
strategy equilibrium, the experimental subjects’ play converged to the equi-
librium, while this was not the case if the true game had multiple equilibria.
In the existing literature, learning occurs while each player maximizes
his inﬁnite horizon expected utility and updates his prior beliefs using the
Bayes rule. Here, in this paper we examine the issue of Bayesian learning
as a direct goal of (one of the) players in a static decision problem and ask
the following questions: in a principal-agent model of regulation with incom-
plete information, (i) how is ‘more information’ described in a situation of
‘incomplete’ learning where the belief of the regulator about the regulated
agent does not convergence to the truth? (ii) is ‘more information’ about
the regulated agent always desirable for the regulator and the principal or,
conversely, undesirable for the regulated agent? (iii) can all modes of conver-
gence of beliefs yield the (equilibrium) outcome of the complete information
game?
We consider a generalized principal-agent model that borrows from Gues-
nerie and Laﬀont (1984). The model involves three players: a principal, an
agent, and a regulator. The agent has a private type parameter which is
unobservable to the other players. However, this parameter is commonly
known to lie in a ﬁnite interval of reals. Both the principal and the agent
derive a transferrable utility from a decision of the agent. The environment
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is economic in the sense that the most preferred decision diﬀer across the
principal and the agent, hence the regulation of the economic activity from
the viewpoint of social equity is inevitable.1
Under the described incomplete information structure the regulator with-
out loss of generality restricts himself, by the Revelation Principle (Gibbard
(1973) and Myerson (1979)), to direct revelation mechanisms which induce
the agent to truthfully report his private information. The optimal regula-
tory mechanism involves a type-dependent subsidy from the principal to the
agent. The objective function of the regulator is the social welfare deﬁned
as a weighted sum of the agent’s and the principal’s utilities net of the sub-
sidy taken/given, with the weight assigned to the welfare of the agent not
exceeding that of the principal. The aim of the regulator is to choose the
optimal decision for each possible type of the agent conditional upon that
the mechanism must be incentive-compatible and individually rational for
the agent. At the optimal solution there exists an inavoidable (ex-post) wel-
fare loss owing to the positive informational rents that should be guaranteed
to the agent, whose net utility is disfavoured by the social welfare function.
Since this welfare loss depends on the regulator’s prior belief as well as its
support, there exists an incentive for the regulator to learn about the private
information of the agent.
Leaving aside the epistemological questions searching for the source of
the ‘new information’, we consider learning situations in which the regulator
is able to conﬁne the true type of the agent conﬁdently to a smaller support
prior to regulation. That is, learning in our model involves a new belief,
obtained after ﬁnite or inﬁnite number of revisions (stages) and deﬁned on
a narrower support that contains the truth. To explicitly deﬁne complete
learning, we ﬁrst describe the complete information belief together with the
social welfare it induces. Since this extreme belief, which is indeed a dirac
function at the truth, is not admissible in our incomplete information setup,
we assume that learning is incomplete in a ﬁnite-stage setup. So we exam-
ine learning by distinguishing two benchmark cases: single-stage incomplete
learning and inﬁnite-stage complete learning.
For single-stage learning, we ﬁrst answer what valuable or more informa-
1Note that our characterization of the principal-agent problem, in general, differs from
a classical one, where the principal coincides with the regulator whose goal is to maximize
the principal’s welfare.
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tion means. We show that a regulator can ascertain that he has obtained
more information only if he has updated his beliefs over the learned ﬁner
support using the Bayes rule. We then examine two cases in which the sup-
port of a Bayesian regulator’s belief shrinks from the left or the right. In
the former case, more information about the regulated agent is interestingly
found to increase his own welfare. This gives rise to the truthful signalling
of the agent about his type space before the implementation of the mecha-
nism. In the latter case where the original support shrinks from the right,
it is the social welfare that is found to increase. For intermediate cases in
which the support of the regulator’s belief shrinks from both sides, the eﬀect
of learning on the social welfare is ambiguous. In that case, we may assume
that the Bayesian regulator or the society does not have a clear incentive to
do learning.2
Finally, our paper considers inﬁnite-stage complete learning with an in-
ﬁnite sequence of revisions of the prior belief over their respective supports
converging to the complete information belief. Here we deﬁne two modes
of convergence: absolute (strong form) convergence and pseudo (weak form)
convergence. An interesting result we establish is that the outcome of the
Bayesian regulatory mechanism is path-dependent. That is, a sequence of
updated beliefs approaching to the truth ensures complete information out-
come only if the mode of convergence is suﬃciently strong.
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the
Bayesian regulation model. Section 3 introduces some preliminaries on learn-
ing and presents our results. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
Consider two players with quasi-linear utility functions
up(x, t, θ) = Vp(x, θ)− t, (1)
ua(x, t, θ) = Va(x, θ) + t, (2)
2The potential for non-learning has also been shown by Kiefer and Nyarko (1989) in a
setting of optimal control of an unknown linear process and by Feldman and McLennan
(1989) in a repeated statistical decision problem with normal disturbances.
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where Vp and Va (up and ua) stand for the utilities (net utilities) of the prin-
cipal and the agent, respectively. Here, θ is the agent’s private information
about his utility function, x is called a decision and t is the total monetary
transfer from the principal to the agent.
The private type parameter θ of the agent is commonly known to lie in
some closed real continuum Θ. Deﬁne θ1 = max(Θ) and θ0 = min(Θ).
The assumptions about the utility functions Vp and Va are:
A0. argmaxxVp(x, θ) = argmaxxVa(x, θ)
A1. ∂(Vp + Va)/∂x > 0
A2. ∂2(Vp + Va)/∂x
2 < 0
A3. ∂2Vp/∂x∂θ ≤ 0
A4. ∂2Va/∂x∂θ ≤ 0
A5. ∂Va/∂θ < 0
A6. ∂3Va/∂x∂θ2 ≤ 0
A7. ∂3Va/∂x2∂θ ≤ 0
The regulator announces a contract between the principal and the agent.
The instruments of the contract are the control of the decision x and the
transfer t to the agent. By the Revelation Principle, the regulator can restrict
himself to direct revelation mechanisms which ask the agent to report his
private information and which give to the agent no incentive to lie.
The optimal regulatory policy is designed to satisfy two conditions ﬁrst of
which is that the agent must never expect a greater net utility by misreporting
than he could by truthfully reporting his private information:
(IC) ua(x(θ), t(θ), θ) ≥ ua(x(θˆ), t(θˆ), θ), for all θ, θˆ ∈ Θ (3)
The second condition is that the regulator can never force the agent to be
regulated unless the agent obtains a nonnegative net utility:
(IR) ua(x(θ), t(θ), θ) ≥ 0, for all θ ∈ Θ (4)
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Let Ua(θ, θˆ) denote the net utility of the agent when he reports his private
parameter as θˆ while θ is the actual parameter. Condition (IC) implies that
Ua(θ, θ) = Ua(θ) satisﬁes
Ua(θ) = max
θˆ∈Θ
ua(x(θˆ), t(θˆ), θ) = ua(x(θ), t(θ), θ) (5)
for all θ ∈ Θ. From the envelope theorem, we obtain
dUa
dθ
=
∂ua
∂θ
=
∂Va
∂θ
. (6)
Similarly, denote by Up(θ) the net utility of the principal when the agent
truthfully reports his private parameter as θ.
The social welfareW (θ) is deﬁned as the sum of the principal’s net utility
and a fraction of the agent’s net utility:
W (θ) = Up(θ) + αUa(θ), (7)
where α ∈ [0, 1] is the relative weight assigned to the net utility of the agent.
Integrating (6) using the assumption (A5) yields
Ua(θ) = −
∫ θ1
θ
∂
∂θ˜
Va(x(θ˜), θ˜)dθ˜. (8)
Inserting Up(θ) = Vp(x(θ), θ) − t(θ) and t(θ) = Ua(θ) − Va(θ) into (7), the
actual social welfare becomes:
W (θ) = Vp(x(θ), θ) + Va(x(θ), θ) + (1− α)
∫ θ1
θ
∂
∂θ˜
Va(x(θ˜), θ˜)dθ˜ (9)
Assumptions 6 and 7 are suﬃcent for the optimal decision x(.), if exists,
to be nonincreasing and implemented by the described subsidy mechanism.
However, it is known that there exists no feasible solution x(.) that maximizes
(9) unless the two players’ welfares are equally weighted in the social welfare
function or that the utility of the agent is seperable in its two arguments.
The common remedy is simply to have a Bayesian regulator.
We consider a Borel ﬁeld T Θ on the type space Θ and regard the subset
AΘ of probability measures on T Θ with densities that are strictly positive at
each element of Θ as the set of admissible prior beliefs for the regulator.
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Let f ∈ AΘ be the prior belief of the regulator and F be the respec-
tive cumulative distribution function. We assume that f becomes common
knowledge before the regulator asks the agent to report his type.
Let the pair (f,Θ) denote the information structure that is commonly
known by all parties in the society.
The objective function of the regulator under the information structure
(f,Θ) is the expected social welfare:
∫ θ1
θ0
(
Vp(x(θ), θ) + Va(x(θ), θ)+(1− α)
∫ θ1
θ
∂
∂θ˜
Va(x(θ˜), θ˜)dθ˜
)
f(θ)dθ (10)
Modifying (10), we obtain the problem of the Bayesian regulator as:
max
x(.)
∫ θ1
θ0
(Vp(x(θ), θ) + Va(x(θ), θ)
+ (1− α)
F (θ)
f (θ)
∂
∂θ
Va(x(θ), θ)
)
f(θ)dθ (11)
s.t. (IC) and (IR)
To simplify the solution and the analysis of the Bayesian regulatory mecha-
nism, we henceforth assume that for all Θ ⊂ IR and f ∈ AΘ:
A8. F (θ)/f(θ) is nondecreasing in θ
Proposition 1. The solution to Bayesian regulation problem (2) satisfies
∂Vp
∂x
+
∂Va
∂x
= −(1− α)
F (θ)
f(θ)
∂2Va
∂x∂θ
. (12)
Proof. See Appendix.
We henceforth assume α ∈ [0, 1) and ∂2Va/∂x∂θ < 0 so as to be in the
Bayesian framework where the beliefs of the regulator aﬀects the optimal pro-
gram (12) through the term F (θ)/f(θ), so called “the inverse of the reverse
hazard rate”.
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Let x¯f denote the solution to (12), and let U¯ fp (θ), V¯
f
p (x¯
f (θ), θ), U¯ fa (θ),
V¯ fa (x¯
f(θ), θ), t¯f (θ), and W¯ f (θ) respectively denote the net and gross utilities
of the principal and the agent, the subsidy and the social welfare evaluated
at the report θ ∈ Θ under the belief f(.).
3 Learning the Unknown: Preliminaries
3.1 Dominance of Beliefs
We ﬁrst deﬁne a dominance relation over beliefs to compare the regulatory
outcomes that these beliefs lead to.
Definition 1. Let f1 ∈ A
Θ1 and f2 ∈ A
Θ2, where Θ1,Θ2 ⊂ Θ. The belief f1
stochastically dominates (in inverse of the reverse hazard rate) the belief f2
on Θ1 ∩ Θ2 if F1(θ)/f1(θ) ≤ F2(θ)/f2(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ1 ∩Θ2.
Lemma 1. Let f1 ∈ A
Θ1 and f2 ∈ A
Θ2, where Θ1,Θ2 ⊂ Θ, be such that f1
stochastically dominates the belief f2 on Θ1 ∩Θ2. Then
x¯f1(θ) > x¯f2(θ) and U¯ f1a (θ) > U¯
f2
a (θ) (13)
for all θ ∈ Θ1 ∩ Θ2.
Proof. See Appendix.
The ﬁnding that the optimal decision x¯f is decreasing in the rate F/f will
be the crux of many welfare results and discussion in the paper. Lemma 1
implies that using the described dominance concept the agent can rank some
admissible beliefs if they have the same support, while a similar preference
relation over the beliefs is not available for the society (or the principal).
In other words, on a given support of positive length there exists no belief
of the regulator which is desired most by the whole society. However, this
negative result needs not take anything away from the potential and incentive
for learning about the true type of the agent. Indeed, as the rest of this
paper will make it clear, there are situations where the social welfare is very
sensitive to the support of beliefs that are believed to contain the searched
type parameter.
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Below, we ﬁrst describe the complete information belief which denotes
the extreme end of learning.
3.2 Complete Information Belief
Hereafter, we ﬁx and denote by θT the private type parameter of the agent.
Definition 2. Given the type space Θ, the regulator has complete infor-
mation about θT ∈ Θ if his belief is represented by the Dirac delta (unit
impulse) function δ(θ − θT ) ∈ T Θ, which is deﬁned as
δ(θ − θT ) = 0 if θ = θT , and
∫ θ1
θ0
δ(θ − θT )dθ = 1. (14)
Denote the belief δ(θ − θT ) by fT . Note that fT /∈ AΘ, i.e. fT is not
an admissible belief in the model. Nevertheless, we are interested in it since
in the continuum of admissible beliefs there exist some that are arbitrarily
‘close’ to fT . Moreover, the belief fT points to the desired direction of learn-
ing, as clearly implied by the following result.
Proposition 2. Actual social welfare at the optimal regulatory solution at-
tains its supremum for the belief fT :
W¯ f
T
(θT ) = sup
f∈AΘ
W¯ f(θT ). (15)
Proof. See Appendix.
The above result is not suprising since the complete information elimi-
nates any welfare loss that would otherwise arise when α = 1 due to the
informational rents the agent gets under an incentive compatible contract.
3.3 Complete and Incomplete Learning
Learning can roughly be described as a change of the current information
structure towards the state of the complete information structure IT =
(fT ,ΘT ), where ΘT = {θT }. We say that learning is complete if the infor-
mation structure resulting from learning is equal to IT , and it is incomplete
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otherwise. Since IT is not an admissible structure in our incomplete infor-
mation model, we can speak of complete learning only in the limit of an
inﬁnite-stage process. Thus, learning achieved in a ﬁnite number of stages is
incomplete by assumption.
In the next section, we ﬁrst consider single-stage incomplete learning
that can straightforwardly be generalized to the ﬁnite-stage case. There, we
deﬁne ‘more information’ resulting from learning and examine its eﬀect on
the regulatory outcome. We then consider inﬁnite-stage complete learning.
For both situations, we simply assume that the learning of the regulator is
exogenous; and the underlying learning technology is such that it always pays
to spend on learning from the viewpoint of the society.
4 Results
4.1 Single-Stage Incomplete Learning
Consider a single-stage incomplete learning process, prior to regulation, which
changes the current information structure (f 0,Θ0) to (f 1,Θ1) where f i ∈ AΘ
i
and Θ1 ⊂ Θ0 with Θ1 /∈ {Θ
0,ΘT}.
Suppose further that the regulator has not acquired any additional in-
formation about the distribution of the types in the ﬁner support Θ1. Then
the posterior belief f1 on Θ1 should be obtained by some (pre-announced)
update rule from the prior f0 on Θ0. In the following deﬁnition we state the
minimal restriction on f 1 to ensure that the information structure (f 1,Θ1)
is superior to (f 0,Θ0).
Definition 3. The structure (f1,Θ1) contains valuable (or more) informa-
tion about θT than the structure (f 0,Θ0) if Θ1 ⊂ Θ0 and f 1(θT )/f 0(θT )
≥ f1(θ)/f0(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ1.
In the single-stage learning we consider the information about θT is in-
complete. Thus, more information resulting from learning does not neces-
sarily imply that the regulator, and the society, are aware of its presence.
Indeed, one can naturally ask the following question: can the regulator be
ever certain that he has “more information” under some incomplete learn-
ing? Note that the regulator can simply check whether Θ1 is a subset of
Θ0. So, the above question boils down to whether the regulator can certify
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that f 1(θT )/f 0(θT ) ≥ f1(θ)/f 0(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ1 without actually knowing
what the value of θT is. Apparently, the answer is ‘yes’ only if f 1(θ)/f0(θ)
is constant over Θ1. This brings us to deﬁne the following.
Definition 4. The belief f1 on Θ1 is the Bayesian update of f 0 on Θ0 where
Θ1 ⊂ Θ0 if f1(θ) = f 0(θ)(1 + γ) for all θ ∈ Θ1, where γ = [
∫
Θ1 f(θ)dθ]
−1− 1.
The following result shows that the regulator can convince the society
that he knows more about the regulated agent only if the regulator is a
Bayesian learner.
Proposition 3. The regulator knows that the structure (f 1,Θ1) contains
more information about θT than the structure (f 0,Θ0) only if f1 is the
Bayesian update of f0.
In sequel, we point to situations in which the agent prefers the Bayesian
regulator to have more information about his private type.
Proposition 4. Suppose the regulator knows that the learned structure
(f1,Θ1) contains more information than the prior structure (f 0,Θ0), where
min(Θ1) > min(Θ0) and max(Θ1) = max(Θ0). Then the welfare of the reg-
ulated agent is higher under the learned structure, i.e. U¯ f
1
a (θ) > U¯
f0
a (θ) for
all θ ∈ Θ1.
Proof. See Appendix.
With Bayesian learning that shrinks the type space from the left, the reg-
ulator’s belief under the learned information structure stochastically domi-
nates his original belief. Then the welfare of the agent increases by Lemma
1, whereas the changes in the welfare of the principal and the society are
ambiguous. Proposition 4 deﬁnitely points to the possibility of honest sig-
nalling of the agent about his type space before the implementation of the
regulatory mechanism.
Corollary 1. Let (f0,Θ0) be the current information structure and the reg-
ulator be known to use Bayes rule in updating his beliefs. Then the agent
finds it profitable to signal that his type parameter cannot be in the interval
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[min(Θ0), θT ).
The following proposition symmetrically examines learning with right-
sided contraction of the type space.
Proposition 5. Suppose the regulator knows that the learned structure
(f1,Θ1) contains more information than the prior structure (f 0,Θ0), where
min(Θ1) = min(Θ0) and max(Θ1) < max(Θ0). Then the welfare of the
regulated agent is lower whereas the welfare of the principal and the so-
ciety are both higher under the learned structure, i.e. U¯f
1
a (θ) < U¯
f0
a (θ),
U¯f
1
p (θ) > U¯
f0
p (θ) and W¯
f1(θ) > W¯ f
0
(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ1.
Proof. See Appendix.
Note that Bayesian learning that shrinks the type space only from the
right leaves the inverse of the reverse hazard rate, hence the optimal decision
variable, unchanged. Nevertheless, the informational rents of the agent be-
come reduced as the upper bound of the integral expression in (8) becomes
smaller under the new information structure. With lower informational rents,
the social welfare in (9) becomes higher independently from the weight α of
the agent’s welfare. It follows that the welfare of the principal, which co-
incides with the social welfare when α = 0, is higher, too. Obviously, the
regulator must keep on this kind of learning until a point where the expected
gain of getting more information is balanced by the cost of learning.
For the general case in which the support of the regulator’s initial belief
shrinks from both sides under Bayesian learning, we can draw no conclusions
as to how the actual welfare of the two agents will change. However, there
are readily available numerical simulations in which learning with the two-
sided contraction of the support leads to a loss in the actual social welfare.
What we can conclude is that more information does not always result in
more social welfare.
4.2 Infinite-Stage Complete Learning
We assume that the regulator initially face the information structure (f 0,Θ0)
and he learns, before the implementation of the mechanism, an inﬁnite se-
quence of structures {(f i,Θi)}∞i=1.
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A direct extension of Propositions 4 and 5 for single-stage learning to
inﬁnite-stage learning is possible by respectively assuming left-sided and
right-sided sequential learning of the type space. Note, however, that left-
sided learning that shrinks the type space uniformly from the left cannot
yield a ﬁner support than Θ∞ = [θT ,max(Θ0)], whereas right-sided learning
that contracts the type space uniformly from the right can at best produce
Θ∞ = [min(Θ0), θT ]. So, single-sided uniform learning of the type space can-
not be considered as an ultimate mode of learning leading to the complete
information (provided that θT is in the interior of Θ0).
Nevertheless, for complete learning one may consider the hybrid of left-
and right-sided contraction as follows: Let {(f i,Θi)}∞i=0 be a sequence such
that Θi+1 is either left-sided or right-sided contraction of Θi, the belief f i+1 is
a Bayesian update of f i, and Θ∞ = ΘT . Then, we know by Proposition 4 that
the welfare of the agent increases at each left-sided contraction of the type
space over the learning sequence. On the other hand, Proposition 5 implies
that the welfare of the agent decreases while the welfare of the principal
and the society increase at each right-sided contraction of the type space.
But, superimposing these two partially opposite results is not conclusive to
guess the level (or even the direction in) which the welfare of the agents and
the society will converge to (change) over the inﬁnite sequence of complete
learning.
Without any hope of extending the welfare results obtained under single-
stage incomplete learning to inﬁnite-stage complete learning, we shall con-
sider an inﬁnite sequence of social welfare induced by a respective sequence
of learned information structures and study its limit behavior by appealing
to the following convergence deﬁnitions.
Definition 5. Consider {(f i,Θi)}∞i=0, where Θ
i ⊂ Θ0 and f i ∈ AΘ
i
. We say
that the sequence f i:
i) pseudo converges to fT if for any given ǫ > 0 and θ ∈ Θ0\{θT } there
is an integer N(θ, ǫ) such that |f i(θ)− fT (θ)| < ǫ for every i ≥ N ;
ii) absolutely converges to fT if it converges in pseudo sense and if for
any ǫ > 0 there is an integer N(ǫ) such that f i(θT ) > 1/ǫ for all i > N .
The inequality |f i(θ)− fT (θ)| < ǫ that must be checked for pseudo con-
vergence boils down to f i(θ) < ǫ by the deﬁnitions of f i and fT . Moreover,
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for θ ∈ Θ0\Θi this condition is trivially satisﬁed, as f i is zero everywhere
outside its support Θi. Note also that the above notion of absolute conver-
gence is the well-known pointwise convergence of a real-valued sequence in
probability theory.
Below we ﬁrst show that the absolute convergence of the regulator’s belief
to the truth eliminates any welfare loss due to informational asymmetry and
yields complete information outcome.
Proposition 6. Let {(f i,Θi)}∞i=0 where Θ
i ⊂ Θ0 and f i ∈ AΘ
i
be such that
f i absolutely converges to fT . Then
lim
i→∞
W¯ f
i
(θT ) = W¯ f
T
(θT ). (16)
Proof. See Appendix.
Notice ﬁrst that the notion of absolute convergence is too strong (that
is why we call it absolute) in the sense that the regulator reduces the den-
sity assigned to all types other than the true type θT down to zero while he
increases the density of θT unboundedly. Thus, the rate F i(θT )/f i(θT ) goes
to zero, making the social welfare approach to its supremum level. How-
ever, with such learning it seems as if the regulator has already distinguished
θT from the other types. It is true that Bayesian updating of beliefs which
would uniquely allow the regulator to verify the availability of more informa-
tion in each stage of learning implies absolute convergence of beliefs. But,
in the inﬁnite-stage ‘complete’ learning model Bayesian learning is no longer
indispensable as we assume that the regulator, representing the society, is
only interested in the limit social welfare. Obviosuly, the stronger the no-
tion of convergence of beliefs, the more expensive will be the cost of learning
in reality. Thus, it is meaningful to examine whether our notion of conver-
gence can be weakened without relaxing the requirement that it yields the
full-information social welfare in the limit. The following result shows that
pseudo convergence, our weaker deﬁnition of convergence, may not yield the
most desired outcome.
Proposition 7. There exists a sequence {(f i,Θi)}∞i=0 where Θ
i ⊂ Θ0, f i ∈
14
AΘ
i
, f i pseudo converges to fT , such that
lim
i→∞
W¯ f
i
(θT ) = W¯ f
T
(θT ). (17)
Proof. See Appendix.
The example provided in the proof of Proposition 7 is a sequence of
information structures with Θ0 = [0, 2] and θT = 1. The densities at each
stage of learning are decreasing over their supports before θT while they are
constant at the level 1/4 everywhere after θT . So, initially inverse of the
reverse hazard rate at θT is F 0(1)/f0(1) = (3/4)/(1/4) = 3. At each stage
of learning, the support shrinks to half of its size around θT as we have
min(Θi) = 1− 2−i and max(Θi) = 1 + 2−i. Thus, the sequence f i is pseudo
converging to fT . Moreover, the density after θT remains to stay at 1/4,
which implies that in learning stage i ≥ 1 half of the probability mass after
θT , which is (1 − F i−1(1))/2, is redistributed over the interval before θT .
Thus, in stage i the probability mass over the interval [min(Θi), θT ] becomes
F i(1) = F i−1(1)+(1−F i−1(1))/2. In the limit of this non-Bayesian learning,
F i(1) approaches 1, while f i(1) remains at (1/4). Since, F i(1)/f i(1) does
not converge to zero, the sequence does not yield the complete information
outcome at the report θT = 1. We should note that the constancy of f i at or
above θT in the proposed example is immaterial for the proof of Proposition
7. In fact, we can trivially modify the described example so as to make the
density f i increase monotonically (but boundedly) after θT but get the same
result.
5 Conclusions
In a generalized principle-agent model, we have examined a Bayesian regula-
tor’s learning about the private information of the regulated agent. We have
speciﬁed what “more information” means and demonstrated that more infor-
mation about the informed agent needs not be undesirable for him. We have
also characterized situtations in which the principal and the society beneﬁt
from the regulator’s learning. The ﬁnal result we have obtained is that out-
comes of Bayesian regulatory mechanisms are, in general, path-dependent.
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The convergence of the regulator’s belief to the truth needs not lead to the
complete information outcome.
Our ﬁndings support the view that one should be careful in determin-
ing what to expect from Bayesian mechanisms with their existing speciﬁca-
tions. It has long been noticed that the subjective nature of beliefs may cast
some doubts on the implementability of the Bayesian mechanisms. Crew
and Kleindorfer (1986), Vogelsang (1988), Koray and Sertel (1990) criticized
the Bayesian approach in regulation on the grounds of unaccountability and
manipulability of the regulator’s subjective prior beliefs. In a very recent
study, Koray and Saglam (2005) examine the same issue in the Baron and
Myerson (1982) model of monopoly regulation. They show that all interest
groups in the society are extremely sensitive to the prior belief of the regula-
tor. There exist beliefs yielding values arbitrarily close to the supremum of
actual welfare and expected welfare of the regulated agent (monopolist) and
the principal (consumers), respectively. Moreover, under some other beliefs
one can come as close to the inﬁmum of actual welfare of both parties as
possible. When the belief of the regulator is unveriﬁable by the public, the
existence of such critical beliefs leads to a bargaining game over the beliefs
between a corrupt regulator and the interest groups in the society, which
distorts the regulatory outcome predicted by Baron and Myerson.
What we add to the previous results is that Bayesian mechanisms may
yield unpredictable and sometimes undesirable outcomes even in the presence
of a benevolent and sincere regulator if the socially eﬃcient type of learning
is not completely speciﬁed as part of the regulatory mechanism.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The integrand in the objective function of (2) is
diﬀerentiated with respect to x(θ) to obtain the optimality condition (12).
Using the asssumptions (A2) and (A7), it is easy to check that the same
integrand is concave in x.
To show that the solution to (12) satisﬁes the incentive-compatibility
constraint (IC), we will ﬁrst prove that the optimal solution x¯ is nonincreasing
in θ. Total diﬀerentiation of (12) with respect to θ yields(
∂2Vp
∂x2
+
∂2Va
∂x2
+ (1− α)
F (θ)
f(θ)
∂3Va
∂2x2∂θ
)
dx¯
dθ
=
(
−(1− α)
d
dθ
(
F (θ)
f(θ)
)
− 1
)
∂2Va
∂x∂θ
−
∂2Vp
∂x∂θ
− (1− α)
F (θ)
f (θ)
∂3Va
∂x∂θ2
.
Using the assumptions (A2), (A3), (A4), (A6) and (A7) together with the
assumption that F (θ)/f (θ) is nondecreasing in θ, we conclude that dx¯/dθ is
nonpositive.
The net utility of the agent when he truthfully reports his type as θ is
Ua(θ) = −
∫ θ1
θ
∂
∂θ˜
Va(x¯(θ˜), θ˜)dθ˜
by (8). The net utility of the agent when he misreports its unknown param-
eter as θˆ while θ is the true parameter is
Ua(θ, θˆ) = Va(x¯(θˆ), θ) + Ua(θˆ)− Va(x¯(θˆ), θˆ). (18)
Subtracting Ua(θ) from (18) we get
Ua(θ, θˆ)− Ua(θ) = −
∫ θ
θˆ
∂
∂θ˜
Va(x¯(θ˜), θ˜)dθ˜ + Va(x¯(θˆ), θ)− Va(x¯(θˆ), θˆ)
= −
∫ θ
θˆ
∂
∂θ˜
(
Va(x¯(θ˜), θ˜)− Va(x¯(θˆ), θ˜)
)
dθ˜ ≤ 0
from (A4) and dx¯(θ)/dθ ≤ 0. Thus, the optimal program (12) is incentive-
compatible.
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Finally to check condition (IR), i.e. Ua(θ) ≥ 0 at the optimal solution x¯,
is straightforward from (8) thanks to assumption (A5). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1. Total diﬀerentiation of (12) at the optimal decision x¯f
with respect to F (θ)/f (θ) yields(
∂2Vp
∂x2
+
∂2Va
∂x2
+ (1− α)
F (θ)
f(θ)
∂3Va
∂2x2∂θ
)
dx¯f
d[F (θ)/f(θ)]
= −(1− α)
∂2Va
∂x∂θ
.
From assumptions (A2), (A4) with strict inequality and (A7) it follows
that x¯f is decreasing in F (θ)/f (θ). Considering equation (8), using as-
sumptions (A4) and (A5) and F1(θ)/f1(θ) < F2(θ)/f2(θ), we conclude that
U¯f1a (θ) > U¯
f2
a (θ) for all θ ∈ Θ. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. Actual social welfare at θT is
W (θT ) = Up(θ
T ) + αUa(θ
T )
= Vp(x(θ
T ), θT )− t(θT ) + α(Va(x(θ
T ), θT ) + t(θT ))
= Vp(x(θ
T ), θT ) + Va(x(θ
T ), θT )− (1− α)Ua(θ
T ).
When α = 1, we have
W (θT ) = Vp(x(θ
T ), θT ) + Va(x(θ
T ), θT )
irrespective of the information structure. Note that the above equation re-
mains to hold true even when α = 1 if there is complete information about
the private type of the agent since optimality and (IR) condition together
leads to t = −Va or Ua = 0, i.e. no informational rents for the agent. The
optimal solution x¯(θT ) then satisﬁes
∂
∂x
Vp(x(θ
T ), θT ) +
∂
∂x
Va(x(θ
T ), θT ) = 0,
yielding W¯ f
T
(θT ).
Noticing that for all f ∈ AΘ we haveW f = V fp +V
f
a −(1−α)U
f
a ≤ V
f
p +V
f
a
by the condition (IR) reading Ufa ≥ 0, and using ∂(V
f
p + V
f
a )/∂x > 0,
∂x¯/∂(F/f) < 0 when ∂2Va/∂x∂θ < 0 and F T (θT )/fT (θT ) = 0, we establish
W¯ f
T
(θT ) = supf∈AΘ W¯
f (θT ). Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 4. Since f 1 is a Bayesian update of f 0 on a ﬁner sup-
port, f 1(θ) > f0(θ) and hence F 1(θ) < F 0(θ) for all θ ∈ [min(Θ1),max(Θ0))
while F 1(max(Θ0)) = F 0(max(Θ0)) = 1. This implies that F 1(θ)/f1(θ) <
F 0(θ)/f 0(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ1. Then from Lemma 1, x¯f
1
(θ) > x¯f
0
(θ) and
U¯f
1
a (θ) > U¯
f0
a (θ) for all θ ∈ Θ
1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5. Since f 1 is a Bayesian update of f0, f 1(θ) =
f0(θ)(1 + γ) for all θ ∈ Θ1, where γ = [F (max(Θ1))]−1 − 1. Note that
F 1(θ)/f 1(θ) = F 0(θ)/f0(θ) and therefore xf
1
(θ) = xf
0
(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ1.
Then from (8) we obtain U¯f
1
a (θ) < U¯
f0
a (θ), since maxΘ
1 < maxΘ0.
We have W¯ f
1
(θ) > W¯ f
0
(θ) since W¯ f
1
(θ) = V¯ f
1
p + V¯
f1
a − (1 − α)U¯
f1
a =
W¯ f
0
(θ) + (1−α)(U¯f
0
a − U¯
f1
a ). Finally, U¯
f1
p (θ) > U¯
f0
p (θ) follows from the fact
that W¯ f
0
(θ) = U¯f
0
p (θ) when α = 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6. By the deﬁnition of absolute convergence limi→∞
f i(θT ) =∞, so limi→∞ F
i(θT )/f i(θT ) = 0. It then follows from the program
(12) using Lemma 1 and assumption (A1) that limi→∞ W¯ f
i
(θT ) = W¯ f
T
(θT ).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7. We will prove that the below sequence of beliefs
satisﬁes the conditions stated in the proposition.
Θ0 = [0, 2], θT = 1 (19)
f0(θ) =

5/4− θ if θ ∈ [0, 1)
1/4 if θ ∈ [1, 2]
0 otherwise
(20)
i ≥ 1 :
Θi = [1− 2−i , 1 + 2−i] (21)
F i−1(1) + (1/2)(1− F i−1(1)) =
1
2
(
hi +
1
4
)
(1−min(Θi)) (22)
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f i(θ) =

hi − h
i−(1/4)
1−min(Θi)
(θ −min(Θi)) if θ ∈ [min(Θi), 1)
1/4 if θ ∈ [1,max(Θi)]
0 otherwise
(23)
First note from (21) that limi→∞ Θi = {1}. Thus, f i(θ) = 0 is zero in
the limit for all θ = 1 implying that the sequence pseudo converges to fT .
Moreover, we have
F i(1)
f i(1)
=
F i−1(1) + (1− F i−1(1))/2
f i−1(1)
>
F 0(1)
f 0(1)
for all i ≥ 1. So, lim i→∞ F
i(1)/f i(1) = 0. We then conclude from the
program (12) using Lemma 1 and assumption (A1) that limi→∞ W¯
fi(1) =
W¯ f
T
(1). Q.E.D.
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